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Abstract. We present rtamt, an online monitoring library for Signal
Temporal Logic (STL) and its interface-aware variant (IA-STL), provid-
ing both discrete- and dense-time interpretation of the logic. We also
introduce rtamt4ros, a tool that integrates rtamt with Robotic Operating
System (ROS), a common environment for developing robotic applica-
tions. We evaluate rtamt and rtamt4ros on two robotic case studies.
1 Introduction
Robotic applications are complex autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS).
Robotic Operating System (ROS) [1] provides a meta-operating system that
helps development of robotic applications. Verification remains a bottleneck, as
existing techniques do not scale to this level of complexity, thus making static
safety assurance a very costly, if not impossible, activity. Run-time assurance
(RTA) is an alternative approach for ensuring the safe operation of robotic CPS
that cannot be statically verified. RTA allows the use of untrusted components
in a system that implements a safe fallback mechanism for (1) detecting anoma-
lies during real-time system operations and (2) invoking a recovery mechanism
that brings the system back to its safe operation. Runtime verification (RV) pro-
vides a reliable and rigorous way for finding violations in system executions and
consequently represents a viable solution for the monitoring RTA component.
Formal specifications play an important role in RV and enable formulating
system properties. Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [2] is a formal specification
language used to describe CPS properties. It admits robustness semantics that
measure how far is an observed behavior from satisfying/violating a specification.
We introduce rtamt3, an online STL monitoring library. rtamt supports stan-
dard STL and its interface-aware extension (IA-STL) [3] as specification lan-
guages. It provides automated generation of online robustness monitors from
specifications under both discrete and continuous interpretation of time. We also
present rtamt4ros4, an extension that integrates rtamt to ROS, thus enabling the
use of specification-based RV methods in robotic applications. We assess the
library on two robotic applications.
3 https://github.com/nickovic/rtamt
4 https://github.com/nickovic/rtamt4ros
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Related Work Several tools support offline monitoring of STL with quali-
tative (AMT2.0 [4]) and quantitative semantics (S-TaLiRo [5] and Breach [6]).
Reelay [7] implements past Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) monitors over discrete
and continuous time and with qualitative and quantitative semantics. RVROS [8]
is a specification-agnostic monitoring framework for improving safety and secu-
rity of robots using ROS. To the best of our knowledge, rtamt/rtamt4ros is the
only tool that implements online robustness STL monitors with both future and
past operators and ROS support.
2 RTAMT Design and Functionality
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Fig. 1. RTAMT architecture.
The main functionality of rtamt
is the automatic generation of
online robustness monitors from
declarative specifications. Given
an input signal in the form of a se-
quence of (time, value) pairs and
a specification, rtamt computes at
different points in time how ro-
bust is the observed signal to the
specification, i.e. how far is it from
satisfying or violating it. The li-
brary consists of 3 major parts: (1) specifications expressed in a declarative
specification language, (2) a front-end with an Application Programming Inter-
face (API) to parse specifications and generate the monitor, and (3) a back-end
that implements the actual evaluation algorithm used by the monitor. The rtamt
library uses a modular architecture depicted in Figure 1. It uses ANTLR4 parser
generator to translate textual (IA-)STL specifications into an abstract parse
tree (APT) data structure used to build the actual monitor. The front-end im-
plements the Application Programming Interface (API) and the pre-processing
steps such as the translation of bounded-future (IA-)STL to past (IA-)STL in
Python. The back-end implements the monitoring algorithms in Python (for
discrete-time and dense-time interpretation) and C++ (for discrete-time inter-
pretation). The library is compatible with both Python 2.7 and 3.7.
Specification language in rtamt is STL with infinity-norm quantitative se-
mantics [9]. The library supports four variants of the specification language –
standard STL and interface-aware STL [3] interpreted over discrete and dense
time. IA-STL extends STL with an input/output signature of the variables and
provides two additional semantic interpretations: (1) output robustness and (2)
input vacuity. Output robustness measures robustness of output signals with
respect to some fixed input. Input vacuity measures how vacuously is a speci-
fication satisfied with input signals only. rtamt accepts as input bounded-future
STL (bfSTL) that restricts the use of the future temporal operators (eventually,
always and until) to bounded intervals. See Appendix A for (IA-)STL definitions.
Parsing and preprocessing follows a two-step procedure. The first step con-
sists in translating the specification given in a textual form to an abstract parse
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tree (APT). The translation uses ANTLR4 to generate a Python parser for the
(IA-)STL grammar. This translation is stll not suitable for online monitors – the
specification may have future temporal operator that would require clair-voyant
monitoring capability. Hence, we implement the pastification procedure [10] that
translates the bfSTL formula φ into an equi-satisfiable past STL formula ψ,
which uses only past temporal operators and postpones the formula evaluation
from time index t, to the end of the (bounded) horizon t+h where all the inputs
necessary for computing the robustness degree are available (see Appendix B).
Monitoring consists of evaluating in online fashion the past STL specification
according to its quantitative semantics, interpreted in discrete or dense time 5.
Discrete-time monitors follow a time-triggered approach in which sensing of in-
puts and output generation are done at a periodic rate. This choice is motivated
by [11], which shows that by weakening/strengthening real-time specifications,
discrete-time evaluation of properties preserves important properties of dense-
time interpretation. This approach admits an upper bound on the use of com-
putation resources. rtamt implements two back-ends for STL monitors – one
in Python (for rapid prototyping) and one in C++ (for efficiency). rtamt uses
Boost.Python library to integrate the Python front-end with the C++ backend.
Dense-time monitors follow an event-driven approach. Their implementation
combines the incremental evaluation approach from [12] with the optimal stream-
ing algorithm to compute the min and max of a numeric sequence over a sliding
window from [13]. Unlike their discrete-time counterparts, continuous-time mon-
itors do not have bounds on memory requirements.
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Fig. 2. Integration of RTAMT to ROS.
Integration of RTAMT to ROS
ROS supports several messaging ap-
proaches, including the subscriber and
publisher pattern. A publisher catego-
rizes a message into a class (called
topic in ROS) and sends it without-
knowing who will read the message.
A subscriber subscribes to a topic and
receives its associated messages, without knowing who sent the message6. The
messages are received and processed in callback() functions. Common ROS ap-
plications associate a callback() function per subscribed variable.
rtamt4ros, illustrated in Figure 2, integrates rtamt into ROS using rospy. The
integration is non-intrusive and provides the user with a generic and transparent
monitoring solution for (IA-)STL specifications. The ROS system under observa-
tion is implemented with ROS nodes, which interact by publishing and receiving
ROS messages on dedicated topics. To publish values of a variable x of type T
on a topic t, ROS node associates x and T to t. Similarly, we declare in the STL
specification variables that we want to monitor, declare their types and associate
them to ROS subscription/publication topics using annotations. Variable names,
their types and associated topics are specification-dependent. rtamt4ros imple-
5 Due to pastification, rtamt only needs to evaluate past temporal operators.
6 Unless the publisher encodes its identity into the message itself.
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ments a dynamic subscription/publication mechanism that uses the concepts of
introspection and reflection (the ability to passively infer the type of an object
and actively change its properties at runtime). Given a (IA-)STL specification,
rtamt4ros infers all the specification variables and dynamically creates their as-
sociated subscribers and publishers. The use of reflection allows us to associate
a single callback() function to all specification variables, by passing the variable
object as an argument to the function. We use the callback() function only to
collect input data and the main ROS loop to make robustness monitor updates.
3 Experiments and Use Scenario
We now present experiments performed using rtamt and rtamt4ros. We apply
rtamt and rtamt4ros on two ROS case studies: Simple Two Dimensional Simulator
(STDR) and Toyota’s Human Support Robot (HSR) platform [14,15]. We use
the STDR example to show step-by-step usage of the rtamt and rtamt4ros for
online monitoring of robotic applications. We note that rtamt is versatile and
could be used for instance for for offline monitoring and non-robotic applications
(see Appendix C). We then evaluate the computation time requirements of the
library. The experiments were performed on a Dell Latitude 7490 with an i7-
8650U processor and 16 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04 on a virtual machine.
Online monitoring of robotic applications: STDR is a ROS-compliant en-
vironment for easy multi-robot 2D simulation (see Figure 3). We use a simple
robot controller with commands encoded as ROS Twist messages that expresses
velocity in free space consisting of its linear and angular parts. The robot state is
encoded as a ROS Odometry message that represents an estimate of the position
(pose) and velocity (twist) in free space. We than use the rtamt4ros and rtamt to
monitor its low-level requirement stating that every step in the command must
be followed by the observed response. The specification spec.stl requires that
at all times the distance between the linear velocity on the x dimension of the
command and the robot is smaller than 0.5. The user first needs to import data
types used in the specification (lines 1-3). Then, it declares variables used in
specification, with their data type and (optionally) their input/output signature
(lines 4, 6 and 8). Special comments in lines 5 and 7 are annotations that provide
additional information about variables - in this case they associate variables to
ROS topics. Finally, line 9 defines the IA-STL property.
1 from geometry_msgs.msg import Twist
2 from nav_msgs.msg import Odometry
3 from rtamt_msgs.msg import FloatMessage
4 input Twist cmd
5 @ topic(cmd, robot0/cmd_vel)
6 output Odometry robot
7 @ topic(res, robot0/odom)
8 output FloatMessage out
9 out.value = always(abs(cmd.linear.x - robot.twist.twist.linear.x
) <= 0.5)
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To monitor the IA-STL specification spec.stl with rtamt/rtamt4ros , it
suffices to run the following command in the ROS environment.
1 roscore rtamt4ros ros_stl_monitor.py --stl spec.stl --period 100
--unit ms
Fig. 3. STDR simulator.
Fig. 4. HSR service robotics applica-
tion.
HSR is a robot with 8 degrees of freedom (DoF), combining 3 DoF of its
mobile base, 4 DoF of the arm and 1 DoF of the torso lift (see Figure 4). The
robot is equipped with ROS modules for localization, path planning and obstacle
avoidance. We used this example to experiment with system-level properties in
a multi-agent environment. We were interested in particular in monitoring the
following requirements: (1) no-collision requirement stating that two robots are
never closer than some dmin distance from each other, and (2) when robot 2 is
closer than d distance from robot 1, then robot 2 two goes in at most T seconds
within d′ distance of some location L. For this industrial application, we present
an abstracted formalization of the above requirements.
1 out1 = always (abs(rob1.pos - rob2.pos) < d)
2 out2 = abs(rob1.pos - rob2.pos) < d implies
3 eventually[0:T](rob1.pos - L) < d’
This experiment demonstrates the use of the library in a sophisticated ROS/Gazebo
environment in an industrial case study. The addition of monitors is orthogo-
nal to the development of the application and the monitors are non-intrusive.
k bound C++ (s) Python (s)
100 0.00014 0.00023
1k 0.0002 0.00085
10k 0.0008 0.029
100k 0.0047 0.31
1M 0.046 72
Table 1. Timing requirement per sin-
gle monitor update.
Timing figures: For online monitors, the
most important quantitative measure is
the computation time of a single moni-
toring update step. We compared the dif-
ference in timing requirements between
the C++ and the Python implementa-
tion of the discrete-time monitoring al-
gorithm. We used for the experiment the
STL specification out = always[0:k]
(a+b > -2) where k is the upper bound on the timing modality of the always
operator that we varied between 100 and 1 million. Table 1 summarized the re-
sults of the experiment. The outcomes clearly demonstrate the efficiency of the
C++ back-end, especially for large upper bounds in temporal modalities.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented rtamt a library for generating online monitors from
declarative specifications and rtamt4ros, its ROS extension, demonstrating their
usability and versatility two robotic case studies.
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A Signal Temporal Logic
We consider Signal Temporal Logic (STL) with both past and future operators
with quantitative semantics and interpreted over discrete time. Let X be a set
of real-valued variables. A valuation v : X → R For x ∈ X maps a variable
x ∈ X to a real value. Given Y ⊆ X, we denote by V (Y ) the set of valuations
over variables in Y . A signal w over X is a sequence (t0, v0) · (t1, v1) · · · (tn, vn)
of (time, valuation) pairs, where t0 = 0 and ti−1 < ti for all i in [1, n]. We note
that for discrete-time interpretation ti = i. For dense-time interpretation, we
assume constant interpolation.
The syntax of a STL formula ϕ over X is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := f(Y ) > 0 | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 U Iϕ2 | ϕ1 S Iϕ2
where Y ⊆ X and I is of the form [a, b] or [a,∞) such that a and b are in N and
0 ≤ a ≤ b.
The quantitaive semantics of a STL formula with respect to a signal w is
described via the robustness degree ρ(ϕ,w, t) indicating how far is the signal w
from satisfying or violating the specification ϕ at time index t.
ρ(f(Y ) > 0, w, t) = f(V (Y ))[t]
ρ(¬ϕ,w, t) = −ρ(ϕ,w, i)
ρ(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, w, t) = max(ρ(ϕ1, w, t), ρ(ϕ2, w, t))
ρ(ϕ1 S Iϕ2, w, t) = maxt′∈((t	I)∩R≥0)(min(ρ(ϕ2, w, t′),mint′′∈(t′,t) ρ(ϕ1, w, t′′)))
ρ(ϕ1 U Iϕ2, w, t) = maxt′∈(t⊕I)(min(ρ(ϕ2, w, t′),mint′′∈(t,t′) ρ(ϕ1, w, t′′)))
From this basic definition of STL we use standard rules to derive the other
Boolean and temporal operators:
true true ≡ ϕ ∨ ϕ′ false false ≡ ¬true
conjunction ϕ1 ∧ f2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2)) eventually Iϕ ≡ trueU Iϕ
always Iϕ ≡ ¬ I¬ϕ once –Iϕ ≡ trueS Iϕ
historically –Iϕ ≡ ¬ –I 6= ϕ next #ϕ ≡ falseU (0,∞)ϕ
previous ϕ ≡ falseS (0,∞)ϕ rise ↑ ϕ ≡¬ϕ ∧ ϕ
fall ↓ ϕ ≡ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ
We consider in this paper two subsets of STL
– Past Signal Temporal Logic (pSTL) that forbids the use of U I , and
– Bounded-Future Signal Temporal Logic (bfSTL) that restricts the use of U I
to intervals [a, b] with both a and b in R≥0.
A.1 Interface-aware Signal Temporal Logic
In this section, we consider STL with input/output signature. Given a set X of
real-valued variables, let U, V ⊆ X be two subsets of X such that U ∩ V = ∅.
Let ϕ be an STL formula and w a signal trace. We define the U -robustness
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relative to V , denoted ρVU (ϕ,w, t) by induction, where the only difference from
the definition of ρ(ϕ,w, t) is the case on numeric predicates:
ρVU (f(Y ) > 0, w, t) =

0 if Y 6⊆ U ∪ V
f(wY [t]) else if Y 6⊆ V
sign(f(wY [t])) · ∞ otherwise
where for all a ∈ R, sign(a) · ∞ = +∞ if a > 0, −∞ otherwise.
An interface-aware signal temporal logic (IA-STL ) specification over X is a
tuple (XI , XO, ϕ), where XI , XO ⊆ X, XI ∩ XO = ∅ and ϕ is a STL formula.
We define two different notions of relative reobustness for IA-STL specifications:
(1) output robustness, denoted µ, as the XO-robustness relative to X\XO, and
(2) input vacuity, denoted ν, the XI -robustness relative to ∅.
B From Bounded-Future STL to Past pSTL
Monitoring specifications with future temporal formulas is challenging because
the evaluation at time index t may depend on the observed inputs at some time
indices t′ > t. bfSTL specifications have a bounded future horizon h that can
be syntactically computed from the formula structure. For such specifications,
the online monitoring challenge can be addressed by postponing the formula
evaluation from time index t, to the end of the (bounded) horizon t+h where all
the inputs necessary for computing the robustness degree are available. In this
section, we briefly sketch this procedure, called pastification.
We first define the temporal depth H(ϕ) of ϕ as the syntax-dependent upper
bound on the actual depth of the specification that is inductively computed as
follows:
H(f(Y ) ≥ 0) = 0
H(¬ϕ) = H(ϕ)
H(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = max{H(ϕ1), H(ϕ2)}
H(#ϕ) = H(ϕ) + 1
H(ϕ1 U Iϕ2) = end(I) + max{H(ϕ1)− 1, H(ϕ2)}
The pastification operation Π on the STL formula ϕ with past and bounded
future and its bounded horizon d = H(ϕ) is defined recursively as follows:
Π(p, d) = –{d}p
Π(¬ϕ, d) = ¬Π(ϕ, d)
Π(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, d) = Π(ϕ1, d) ∨Π(ϕ2, d)
Π(#ϕ, d) = Π(ϕ, d− 1)
Π( [a,b]ϕ, d) = –[0,b−a]Π(ϕ, d− b)
Π(ϕ1 U [a,b]ϕ2, d)↔
∨z
i=1Π(ϕ
i
1 U [a,b]ϕ2, d)
↔ ∨zi=1Π(#ϕi1∧
[a−1,b−1](ϕi1 ∧#ϕ2), d)
Formally, we say that for an arbitrary bfSTL formula ϕ, signal w and time
index t ∈ N, ρ(ϕ,w, t) = ρ(Π(ϕ), w, h(ϕ)).
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C Other Use Scenarios
In this paper, we focused on the use of rtamt combined with rtamt4ros in the con-
text of robotic applications using ROS. However, rtamt is a much more versatile
library and can be used in many other (non-robotic) applications. We illustrate
the versatility of rtamt with two additional applications: (1) general offline ana-
ysis of time series, and (2) model-based development of CPS applications with
MATLAB/Simulink.
C.1 Offline Analysis of Time Series with rtamt
We use a simplified real-valued request-grant protocol to illustrate (1) interface-
aware STL semantics, (2) programmatic interface to rtamt and (3) offline mon-
itoring capability of rtamt. We say that a request is issued whenever the value
of the signal req is greater or equal to 3. Similarly, the grant is issued whenever
the value of the signal gnt is greater or equalt to 3. The specification requires
that every request is eventually followed within 5 time units by a grant. Figure 5
illustrates 4 different signals: (a) satisfies the requirement, (b) vacuously satisfies
the requirement (request is never issued), (c) and (d) violate the requirement.
We demonstrate the discrete-time offline monitoring by iterating over the input
sequence and applying the online monitor in each iteration and collecting the
output.
71 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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0
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6 6
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req req gnt
(a) (b)
req gnt req gnt
(c) (d)
gnt
Fig. 5. Examples of request-grant signals.
IA-STL specification of the request-grant requirement from Section 1 is the
formula ({req}, {gnt}, ϕ), where ϕ ≡ (req ≥ 3 → [0,5]gnt ≥ 3). The text
below expresses ϕ using the rtamt STL grammar.
1 import rtamt
2 ...
3
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4 data = read_csv(’req-gnt.csv’)
5
6 spec = rtamt.STLIOSpecification(is_pure_python=True)
7 spec.name = ’IA-STL Request-Grant Specification’
8 spec.declare_var(’req’, ’float’)
9 spec.declare_var(’gnt’, ’float’)
10 spec.declare_var(’out’, ’float’)
11 spec.set_var_io_type(’req’, ’input’)
12 spec.set_var_io_type(’gnt’, ’output’)
13 spec.spec = ’out = always((req>=3) implies (eventually[0:5](gnt
>=3)))’
14 spec.iosem = ’output-robustness’
15 try:
16 spec.parse()
17 except rtamt.STLParseException as err:
18 print(’STL Parse Exception: {}’.format(err))
19 sys.exit()
20
21 for i in range(len(data1[’ gnt’])):
22 rob = spec.update(i, [(’req’, data1[’ req’][i][1]), (’gnt’,
data1[’ gnt’][i][1])])
We first note that we instantiate the class STLIOSpecification to create an IA-
STL monitor. We set the argument is pure python to True if we want to create a
pure Python monitor. This flag is set to False for monitors using the C++ back-
end. We observe that we use the method set var io type(var name, var io type)
to declare a variable as input or output. We use the attribute iosem to define
the IA-STL semantics that we want to use – the available options are standard,
output-robustness and input-vacuity.
Consider signals from Figure 5 and the request-grant specification. Standard
robustness ρ(ϕ,w4) is −1, while output robustness µ(ϕ,w4) is −2 – standard
robustness gives the same treatment to input and output signals resulting the
input dominating robustness computation. Standard robustness measures in this
case how good is the input, while output measures how bad is the grant. We also
have that µ(ϕ,w2) = +∞ while ν(ϕ,w2) = 1. Output robustness value tells us
that the input is vacuous, while the input vacuity measures how vacuous it is.
The dense-time monitor for the same input signal and specification can be
invoked by instantiating the STLIOCTSpecification instead of STLIOSpecification.
We note that the signature of the update method is different for discrete-time
and dense-time monitors:
Discrete-time update(time index, [ (var name, value) ... ])
Dense-time update([[var name, [[time, value] ...] ...])
C.2 Model-based design of CPS with rtamt
We now introduce a case study that we use as a running example to illustrate our
approach step by step. We consider the Aircraft Elevator Control System [?] to
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illustrate model-based development of a Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery
(FDIR) application for a redundant actuator control system.
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Fig. 6. Aircraft Elevator Control System [?].
Figure 6 shows the architecture of an aircraft elevator control system with
redundancy, with one elevator on the left and one on the right side. Each elevator
is equipped with two hydraulic actuators. Both actuators can position the eleva-
tor, but only one shall be active at any point in time. There are three different
hydraulic systems that drive the four actuators. The left (LIO) and right (RIO)
outer actuators are controlled by a Primary Flight Control Unit (PFCU1) with
a sophisticated input/output control law. If a failure occurs, a less sophisticated
Direct-Link (DL/PFCU2) control law with reduced functionality takes over to
handle the left (LDL) and right (RDL) inner actuators. The system uses state
machines to coordinate the redundancy and assure its continual fail-operational
activity.
This model has one input variable, the input Pilot Command, and two output
variables, the position of left and right actuators, as measured by the sensors.
This is a complex model that could be extremely hard to analyze in case of
failure. In fact, the model has 426 signals, from which 361 are internal variables
that are instrumented (279 real-valued, 62 Boolean and 20 enumerated - state
machine - variables) and any of them, or even a combination of them, might be
responsible for an observed failure.
When the system behaves correctly, the intended position of the aircraft
required by the pilot must be achieved within a predetermined time limit and
with a certain accuracy. This can be captured with several requirements. One
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of them says that whenever Pilot Command cmd goes above a threshold m, the
actuator position measured by the sensor must stabilize (become at most n units
away from the command signal) within T + t time units. This requirement is
formalized in STL with the following specification:
1 out = always((cmd >= m) -> eventually[0:T]always[0,t](abs(cmd -
pos) < n)
Fig. 7. Expected behavior of AECS. Fig. 8. Failure of the AECS.
Figures 7 and 8 show the correct and faulty behavior of the system, respec-
tively. The control system clearly stops following the reference signal after 4
seconds.
We use rtamt to do sensitivity analysis and falsification testing, two com-
mon approaches supported by tools like Breach and S-TaLiRo. Sensitivity of
the model robustness to its STL requirements is studied by uniformly varying
input parameters, simulating the model for each combination and monitoring
the simulation outcomes against the requirements. Figure 9 shows a heat-map
visualizing the outcomes.
Given an STL specification and the system model, falsification testing aims
to identify an input signal that results in the violation of the requirement. It
does so by solving a search problem over input parameter variables to identify
a trace that violates the specification. The outcome is shown in Figure 10.
Finally, we integrate rtamt to MATLAB Simulink to evaluate specifications
during simulation in an online fashion. We create a custom online monitoring
Simulink block that integrates rtamt to a Level-2 MATLAB S-Function. At every
simulation step, the monitoring block reads the relevant Simulink signal values
and computes robustness for that simulation step. The robustness value is given
back to the simulation environment. This approach has the advantage of be-
ing able to stop the simulation upon detection of property violation. This can
save significant simulation time, especially when property violations are detected
early in the simulation.
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Fig. 9. Sensitivity analysis of AECS. Fig. 10. Falsification testing of AECS.
D Reproducing Examples
All the examples shown in the paper and its Appendix, except the proprietary
Toyota HSR robotic application, can be found on the repositories, together with
instructions on how to run them.
Example Repository Dependencies Directory
STDR rtamt4ros ROS, STDR stdr control
Timing rtamt none examples/timing
Offline req-gnt rtamt none examples/offline monitors
Sensitivity analysis rtamt MATLAB/Simulink examples/sensitivity analysis simulink
Falsification testing rtamt MATLAB/Simulink examples/falsification testing simulink
Online Simulink rtamt MATLAB/Simulink examples/online monitos matlab simulink
